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DETERMINATION OF RELATED PARTIES: A CRITICAL
DISCUSSION OF THE VALUE TEST PRESCRIBED
IN THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
Transactions between closely related taxpayers may result in unintended
tax benefits unless such transactions are made subject to special tax treat-
ment.' A most important consideration in drafting amendments to disallow
these benefits is the test used to determine the "closeness" of given relation-
ships. In the 1934 Revenue Act, Congress introduced a new test designed to
measure the extent of the relationship between a corporation and its stock-
holder—the percent in value of the corporation's stock owned by the stock-
holder.2 This "value test" has been carried forward, and is used in several
sections of the current Internal Revenue Code. 3 Transactions between a
stockholder and a corporation which are within the purview of these sections
are subject to different tax treatment when the stockholder's interest in the
corporation exceeds a prescribed level.
Section 1239, for example, provides that when a stockholder owns more
than 80 percent in value of the outstanding stock of the corporation, he will
not receive capital gains treatment of the gains derived from selling capital
assets to his corporation. Such gains must be treated as ordinary income if
section 1239 applies. An illustration of the application of section 1239 was
given in a recent court opinion.
Section 1239 prevents capital gain treatment of a "sale or exchange"
of depreciable property to a controlled corporation. . . . Without
this section a taxpayer who had property which had been depreciated
to a low basis could sell that property to a controlled corporation ...
and pay only capital gains rates on the gain. The transferee (who
is virtually identical to the transferor in the proscribed area) could
then redepreciate the property, using the sale price as a new basis.
The depreciation, of course, would be deducted from ordinary in-
come. Section 1239 renders such a scheme profitless by taxing the
1 Reilly, An Approach to the Simplification and Standardization of the Concepts
"The Family," "Related Parties," "Control," and "Attribution of Ownership," 15 Tax
L. Rev. 253 (1960).
2 Act of May 10, 1934, ch. 277, § 24, 48 Stat. 691. Section 267 of the 1954 Code
was derived from this act.
3 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954 [hereinafter referred to as the Code], §§ 267 (b)(2 ),--
(3),(8), 318(a) (2)(C), (3)(C), 1239(a)(2). See also Code § 304(c)(1).
Code § 267 disallows certain losses, expenses and interest resulting from transactions
between related parties when the taxpayer owns over 50 percent in value of the corpo-
ration's outstanding stock. Section 304, which concerns redemptions through use of
related corporations or subsidiaries, alternately defines control as owning at least 50 per-
cent of the total value of all classes of stock. Control is a prerequisite under this section
to treatment of certain acquisitions as distributions in redemption of the stock of the
issuing corporation. Section 318 sets out rules for attribution of stock ownership between
a corporation and a stockholder who owns 50 percent or more in value of the stock
of the corporation. These attribution rules are used in eight other sections of the Code,
with tax consequences depending upon the extent of the taxpayer's stock ownership
including ownership determined by attribution.
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gain on the transfer at ordinary rather than capital rates. 4 (Emphasis
added.)
The decision in two recent cases depended on whether section 1239
should be invoked in determining the tax consequences of certain transac-
tions between dominant stockholders and their corporations. 5 Application of
the value test was determinative in both cases, but in spite of remarkably
similar facts, the courts' findings were opposite. It is submitted that the
outcomes in these apparently contradictory cases illustrate the problems which
are inherent in the value test. It is the purpose of this comment to examine
the value test prescribed by sections 267, 304, 318, and 1239. Emphasis will
be placed on the problems this test presents to the taxpayer in tax planning
and to the courts in administering the tax law. An alternative test will be
suggested after the value test has been examined in light of these two recent
cases.
I. THE PROBLEM: VALUE Is AN ELUSIVE STANDARD
As Justice Brandeis stated, "value is a word of many meanings." 5 In no
area of the law is this more true than in valuation of stock, where at least four
different concepts prevail.? While considerable effort has been expended in
developing a formula or rule of thumb to resolve valuation problems, none
has yet been found. Experts have concluded that every valuation problem
is different and that each is affected by its particular time and its particular
economic setting. As one commentator has noted, "there is no getting away
from a certain amount of laborious investigation, analysis and comparison to
which must then be applied the most important factor of all, good business
judgment." 8 (Emphasis added.)
Any test which relies heavily on judgment invites dispute. In tax
matters, the judgment of the taxpayer and the judgment of the Commissioner
will rarely coincide because, as a practical matter, their interests differ.
Additional problems arise because the stock which must be valued is gen-
erally that of a close corporation, and, therefore, there are less likely to
have been sales on an exchange to provide an easy index of valuation .°
4 United States v. Parker, 376 F.2d 402, 407 (5th Cir. 1967).
5 Harry Trotz, P-H Tax Ct. Rep. & Mem. Dec. fi 67,139 (1967) ; United States v.
Parker, 376 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1967).
6 Southwestern Bell Tel. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 310 (1923) (dis-
senting opinion).
7 Generally, the four concepts are: (1) "Market value" as the price for which the
stock can be sold; (2) "Market value" as the price of equivalent shares; (3) "Intrinsic
value" in an investment analysis sense; and (4) Value to the owner. 2 J. Bonbright, Valua-
tion of Property 1020 (1937).
8 Ovens, Methods of Valuation for Privately Owned Businesses and Closely Held
Companies, 36 Canadian Bar Rev. 57, 59 (1958).
o Rev. Rul. 59-60 § 2.02 states that when a large percentage of a company's stock
is held in a few hands (as it is in cases within the purview of these sections) the irregular
sales which do occur seldom reflect all the elements in fair market value. Rev. Rul. 60,
1959-1 Cum. Bull. 237, This reasoning should also apply to publicly held corporations
within the purview of these sections. Since the taxpayer whose interest is being measured
necessarily holds a very large block, the number of shares traded is normally too small
in relation to the total number outstanding to accurately reflect the fair market value
of the taxpayer's holdings.
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Further, control and restrictions on alienability are commonly present in
close corporations.n These factors are important to valuation, but they
greatly complicate the valuation process.
Treasury regulations and rulings have been unsuccessful in providing
an easy-to-use valuation method. In fact, Revenue Ruling 59-60 specifically
states that no formula can be developed." The Treasury Regulations only
indicate some of the factors to be considered. For example, Regulation
20.2031-2(0(2) provides for stock valuation based on the company's net
worth, prospective earning power, dividend-paying capacity, and other rele-
vant factors, which include good will, the economic outlook of the industry,
the company's position in the industry, the company's management, and the
degree of control represented by the block. Regulation 20.2031-2(h) adds
the factor of restrictions on sale.
These regulations neither explain to the taxpayer how he is to determine
the economic outlook of the industry nor how he is to prove it with a
sufficient degree of accuracy to arrive at a reasonably precise estimate of
value. The same valuation and proof problems are encountered with respect
to several of the other factors suggested in the regulation. There is absolutely
no guide to the taxpayer as to how much weight each factor is to be accorded
in arriving at a final valuation. Regulation 20.2031-2(h) explains that these
matters are to be determined upon the facts of each case. It is submitted
that such enumerations of factors to be considered offer little help to a
taxpayer confronted with a specific valuation problem. They are incomplete
and lack rules for appraising the influence of the factors listed.
Neither do court opinions offer the taxpayer much help with his valua-
tion problems, for the courts have not developed a set of basic standards.
While there have been hundreds of stock valuations made by the courts,
the opinions only point out that there are many factors to be considered,
each to be given different weight in different fact situations. 12
The nonexistence of any easy or sure standard for the valuation of stock
holdings is a reflection of the complexity of the determination required. Since
tax considerations undoubtedly play an important role in shaping many
transactions, the elusiveness of the valuation standard places the taxpayer in
a difficult decision-making position because he will rarely be sure that he
has complied with the statute. Naturally, the taxpayer can avoid any con-
flict by keeping his holdings at a level clearly below that allowed by the
Code in order to determine the cut-off point for the receipt of tax benefits,
or the taxpayer may forego the transaction entirely. But neither of these
alternatives should be forced on the taxpayer if they can be avoided by re-
drafting the statute.' 3
10 Since these sections deal only with closely related units, often close corporations,
it is to be expected that the dominant stockholder will usually control the corporation
and that he will often issue stock to others subject to restrictions which allow him to
control any future disposition of the minority interests.
11 Rev. Rul. 60, supra note 9, at 243.
Rustigan, Lentz & Olsen, Problems in Valuing Stock of a Close Corporation,
N.Y.U. 23d Inst. on Fed. Tax. 1261 (1965).
13 It should be kept in mind that some tax rate differentials were introduced to
encourage certain practices and to provide for deserved deductions. The sections under
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II. RECENT CASES
The problems created by the use of the value test were central to the
decisions in two recent cases: Harry Trotz 14 and United States v. Parker.°
Both cases arose under section 1239, but the valuation issue would have been
the same under sections 267, 304 or 318. The taxpayers in both cases were
disputing the Commissioner's ordinary-income treatment of the gains they
received when they sold capital assets to newly formed corporations. In
both cases the valuation issue was important because the taxpayers' holdings
were very close to the limit allowed under section 1239—Trotz owned 79
percent of the number of his corporation's stock and Parker owned exactly
80 percent of the number of outstanding shares of his corporation. The
other important facts bearing on the valuation issue were also remarkably
similar.
In Parker, the taxpayer owned a wholesale and retail gasoline and oiI
company. A corporation was formed to carry on the business. One thousand
shares of a single class of common stock were authorized and subscribed,
eight hundred shares to the Parkers 16 and two hundred shares to Eaves.
The Parkers paid for their stock by transferring property valued at $93,400
to the corporation. Eaves agreed to pay $23,350 over five years for his
interest." Parker and Eaves entered into a stock-transfer agreement pro-
viding that should Eaves resign, die, or be permanently discharged by the
corporation, he would sell his stock to Parker for an agreed-upon price deter-
mined by the fair market value per share of the corporation's assets excluding
intangibles. Notice of the transfer agreement was placed on each stock certifi-
cate and the stock could not be transferred except in accordance with it." The
stock of both Eaves and Parker was subject to a further restriction which
required that an offer be made to the corporation before a sale could be
made to an outsider. The latter restriction did not establish the price of the
stock. If the corporation did not accept the offer, the stock could be sold at
or above the price at which the shares were offered to the corporation.
Parker reported the gain on the property which he transferred to the
corporation as a capital gain. The Commissioner invoked section 1239 and
taxed the gain as ordinary income. Parker paid the assessment and sued
discussion were passed to disallow these advantages in a limited class of cases. It is a
dear price to pay for this result if these sections unnecessarily discourage supposedly
favorable transactions or disallow legitimate deductions. In fact, the legislative history of
one of these sections demonstrates a congressional intent to minimize the inhibiting
effect of .
 that section. That intent was manifested in § 1239 by raising the percentage in
value required to invoke the section from over 50 percent to over 80 percent in order
not to unduly restrict transactions in capital assets. The relevant history of § 1239 is
summarized in Mitchell v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 533, 536 & nn.6-8 (4th Cir. 1962).
14 P-H Tax Ct. Rep. Sr Mem. Dec. A 67,139 (1967), deciding on remand from 361
F.2d 927 (10th Cir. 1966), rev'g 43 T.C. 127 (1964).
15
 376 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'g 242 F. Supp. 117 (W.D. La. 1965).
18
 Ownership of Parker's wife's shares was attributed to Parker under § 1239.
17
 Stock was issued to Parker and Eaves in proportion to the amount of paid-in
capital each contributed. Of total paid-in capital of $116,750, Parker contributed 80
percent and Eaves contributed 20 percent.
Is The operative provisions of the agreement arc set out by the court of appeals.
376 F.2d at 404 n.l.
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for a refund in the district court. The district court held that the per-share
value of Parker's shares was equal to the per-share value of Eaves' shares,
and therefore, since Parker owned only 80 percent of the number of shares
outstanding, section 1239 was improperly applied. It made no difference that
all of Eaves' shares were not issued and could not be voted" or that the
transferability of Eaves' stock was limited by a stock-transfer agreement
which did not apply to Parker's stock. The market value of the stock was
established by the amount of paid-in capital. Since both Eaves and Parker
contributed equal amounts per share, and too little time had passed for the
stock to change in value, Parker did not own more than 80 percent in value
of the outstanding stock.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the words "in value"
referred to fair market value of the stock, and that Parker's stock had a
greater per-share value than Eaves' stock. The court found that the restric-
tions placed on Eaves' stock made it less easily transferable than Parker's
stock and, therefore, less valuable. In addition, the court held that corporate
control increased the value of Parker's shares in relation to Eaves', for by
virtue of his overwhelming control, Parker could protect his investment by
conducting the affairs of the corporation according to his own judgment
and without regard to Eaves' opinions. The court noted that it was not
necessary to determine the extent to which restrictions and control increased
the value of Parker's shares. Since he owned 80 percent of the number of
outstanding shares, any increase in the relative value of Parker's shares or
decrease in the relative value of Eaves' shares would mean that Parker
owned over 80 percent in value of the stock. Therefore, the court held that
section 1239 was properly invoked by the Commissioner.
Although the court of appeals in Parker never reached a dollar valua-
tion, its approach to the valuation issue is similar to the approach tradi-
tionally used by courts in stock valuation for other tax purposes. In the
Trotz case, however, the Tax Court used a quite different approach even
though it was dealing with a similar fact pattern. Harry Trotz, the owner
of a small construction firm, decided to reorganize his business in a corporate
form. The charter of Trotz Construction, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Con-
struction) provided for four hundred shares of authorized common stock, par
value $100 per share. Three hundred-sixteen shares (79%) were distributed
to Trotz and his wife, and eighty-four (21%) were distributed to Ben F.
Kelly who became an officer in Construction. This percentage distribution
was chosen specifically to avoid the consequences of section 1239. 2° Trotz
purportedly loaned Kelly the $8,400 required for Kelly's stock purchase, and
to secure payment, Kelly pledged his shares and any dividends he might
receive to Trotz. As part of the same transaction, Kelly executed an option
contract which permitted Trotz to purchase Kelly's stock at a price prorated
" The district court found that under Louisiana law, while shares subscribed are
considered outstanding, they cannot be issued until the subscription price is fully paid,
and that only issued shares could vote. Parker v. United States, 242 F. Supp. 117, 120-21
(W.D. La. 1965). Eaves' original payment of $7,500 entitled him to 64.239 issued shares.
It is noted that Parker's subscription of 800 shares was fully paid and issued, and had full
voting rights.
20 Brief for Petitioner on Remand at 5, P-H Tax Ct. Rep. & Mem. Dec. lj 67,139.
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to tangible book value. The option was operative at any time Kelly ceased
to be an officer or director of the corporation. 21 Since the by-laws of Con-
struction allowed any officer or director to be removed by majority vote of
the stock, in effect the option could be exercised as Trotz desired.
In deciding the case, the Tax Court first attributed the ownership of
Kelly's shares to Trotz because of the option agreement and the fact that
Trotz could make it operative at any time. The court of appeals reversed on
this issue stating that the ownership attribution provisions of section 1239
did not provide for attribution on the basis of an option to purchase. The
Government, however, made the argument that even if Kelly's shares could
not be attributed to Trotz, he nevertheless owned over 80 percent in value of
the outstanding shares. This question had been left open in the Tax Court.
The court of appeals rejected Trotz' response that the value test was to be
applied only where a corporation had more than one class of stock, pointing
out that no such distinction is called for in the statute. It similarly rejected
Trotz' contention that the value test was too difficult to apply. The court held
that since the statute uses the words "in value," they must have meaning, and
that a numerical count of the number of shares owned was not determinative.
The case was remanded to the Tax Court to make a factual determination
as to whether Trotz' holdings were over 80 percent in value of the outstanding
stock. The opinion of the court of appeals in Trotz is consistent with the
opinion of the court of appeals in Parker since the court clearly implied that
it would be proper for the Tax Court to find Trotz' shares more valuable
than Kelly's.
In the Tax Court on remand; the Government argued that Trotz'
holdings were worth more per share than Kelly's because the true book
value of the stock was $42,000, and that Trotz' 79 percent stock interest
had a value of $38,000 or 90 percent because Trotz had control of an option
to purchase Kelly's . stock.22
The court rejected these arguments and held in favor of the taxpayer.
It did not do so, however, by a simple count of the shares held by Trotz
and Kelly. Its decision was based upon the nature of a small construction
business which worked for the State on a low bid basis. It reasoned that
since such a corporation had no going-concern value, no goodwill could be
attributed to it. The court then concluded that the existence of control was
irrelevant since a purchaser of such a business would not be acquiring a going
business, but rather the underlying assets.
The restrictions were also held to have no effect upon the value of the
21 The operative provisions of the agreement are set out by the Tax Court. Harry
Trotz, 43 T.C. 127, 129-30 (1964).
22 The Commissioner arrived at this figure by adding his estimate of goodwill
($2,000) to the corporation's book value of assets ($40,000). The Commissioner also
maintained that Trotz' 79 percent stock interest had a value of $38,000, or 90 percent
of the corporation's value. This was an increase in value of $7,600 from his original
contribution of $31,600. The Commissioner justified his valuation on the grounds that
the factor of control was present in Trotz' holdings and because Eaves' shares were
subject to Trotz' option. The taxpayer commented on the Government's financial manipu-
lations by stating, "It is a study in the creation of 'instant wealth' . . , ." Brief for
Petitioner on Remand at 8, P-H Tax Ct. Rep. & Mem. Dec. if 67,139.
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stock due to the lack of going-concern value. Kelly was guaranteed a price
equal to his pro rata share of underlying assets, and .this was the highest price
that could be obtained on the market.
Although both cases involved similar fact situations, they were decided
differently. That the court of appeals in Parker and the Tax Court in Trotz
used different criteria to value the stock before them is not surprising since
the problems involved in stock valuation are numerous and there is no gen-
erally accepted agreement on the proper way these problems should be met.
III. Two FACTORS INFLUENCING VALUE
The factors of corporate control and restrictions on alienability were
important to the stock valuations in both Parker and Trotz. Even with regard
to factors which occur as frequently as do restrictions and control, it is
difficult to find accord among the courts on the treatment of such factors.
A. Restrictions on Alienability
Before attempting an appraisal of the effect of a restriction on the value
of the restricted stock it is necessary to establish the exact nature of the
restriction. In Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 23 a restriction which prohibited
sale of the stock as long as the current operating syndicate functioned was
held to deprive the restricted stock of all value. One reason for the decision
was that the restrictions on sale of the stock and the speculative nature of
the business 24 prevented the stock from having a reasonably ascertainable
market value. 25 Because of the nature of the business and the indefinite
duration of the stock restriction, 26 Tex-Penn presents an extreme fact situa-
tion, but other cases with less extreme facts have followed Tex-Penn in
finding stock subject to similar restrictions valueless. In Prop per v. Commis-
sioner,27 the stock of a textile company was subject to a five-year agreement
prohibiting sales except with the consent of the bankers who were aiding in
the financing of that corporation. The value of stock not subject to the re-
striction was established by sales at $33.00 per share. The Commissioner
valued the restricted stock at $21.00 per share, but his valuation was not
upheld. The court of appeals followed Tex-Penn and found the stock to be
without ascertainable value.
Other restrictions on the alienability of stock have been held by
several courts to be determinative of the value of the restricted stock with-
out depriving it of all value. An option which can be exercised at the call of
23 300 U.S. 481 (1937).
24 The restriction is set out by the Board of Tax Appeals. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 28
B.T.A. 917, 939-40 (1933). Tex-Penn was engaged in developing oil leases. The Supreme
Court did not indicate to what extent its holding was based on the speculative nature
of the business, it only stated that it was one factor considered. This element has often
been used to distinguish the case. See p. 179 infra.
25 The Court seemed concerned that any value found would be based largely on
guesswork. But other courts have been less troubled by this problem. See, e.g., Edith G.
Goldwasser, 47 B.T.A. 445 (1942).
26 For another approach to determine the effect of a restriction with an indefinite
duration, see William C. Newman, 10 B.T.A. 158 (1928), aff'd, 40 F.2d 225, rehearing
denied, 41 F.2d 743 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 858 (1930).
27 89 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1937).
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the option holder, has been held to limit the value of the restricted stock to
the price at which the option is available. A leading case in this area is
Helvering v. Salvage, 28 where the stock was available at the option price of
$100.00. Each share of unencumbered stock in this case was found to be
worth $1,164.70 based on the book value of the corporation's assets; the
taxpayer had purchased the stock for $166.66. The Supreme Court held the
maximum value for the stock was $100, the price at which the option was
available. Similarly, in Wilson v. Bowers, 29 stock was available at an estab-
lished price on the option holder's demand but the Commissioner taxed
them at a substantially higher value. As in Salvage, the court held that the
option price set an upper limit on the stock value.
Judge Learned Hand, expanding on the rule of the Salvage and Wilson
cases in Commissioner v. McCann,a° stated that it applied when the option
was immediately available, since it is assumed that the option will be exer-
cised if the market value exceeds the option price. But, when the option
is exercisable only on the happening of a future event, the court reasoned
that the option price was not determinative but was only one factor to be
considered in valuation. He held the latter rule to apply in McCann even
though on the happening of the event which made the option operable (the
death of the stockholder or the termination of his employment with the
corporation) the corporation was obligated to purchase the stock for its book
value.
Salvage, Tex-Penn and Propper should not be relied upon as authority
without question, even for cases with similar fact situations. Each valuation
problem presents a unique fact situation and some courts have tended to
emphasize the differences in the case before them rather than the similarities
with these leading cases. Because valuation is a mixed question of law and
fact, sufficient latitude is available to courts to make such distinctions. For
example, the court in Heiner v. Gwinner31 valued stock subject to a one year
prohibition against sale. The court distinguished Tex-Penn because of the
lack of speculative element in the business, 32 and it distinguished Propper
because the restriction in that case was for five years. The court also pur-
ported to rely on other factual distinctions but it did not elaborate on them.
The stock before the court in Charles T. Kline" contained two restric-
tions. The first, similar to that in Salvage, required that an offer be made
to the directors at a set price should the stockholder leave the employment
of the corporation. Varying prices were set depending on the circumstances
surrounding the termination of the stockholder's employment. The other
restriction was similar to that in Tex-Penn, that is, it prohibited sale of the
28
 297 U.S. 106 (1936).
29 57 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1932). This is an estate tax case. By its terms, the option
was operable on the stockholder's death. Therefore, at the time of valuation, the option
was subject to immediate exercise. Although in Salvage the option was exercisable at any
time, the practical effect of the option in Wilson at the time of valuation was the same.
39 146 F.2d 385 (2d Cir. 1944).
31 114 F.2d 723 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 714 (1940).
32 See note 24 supra.
33




stock without consent of the directors of the corporation. In Kline, the tax-
payer argued that the restricted stock had no value, and alternatively that
its maximum value was the lowest price set by the option, that available on
his discharge." The Commissioner valued the stock at $43.00 per share;
both the Tax Court and the court of appeals indicated that the intrinsic value
of the stock was above that figure. The court of appeals distinguished Tex-
Penn and Propper on the grounds of lack of a speculative element. It dis-
tinguished Salvage because the court felt it was unlikely the option would
be exercised by the directors. The court upheld the Commissioner's valuation,
noting that although the restriction may have lessened the value of the stock,
the Commissioner had made ample allowance for any reduction in value by
his appraisal of $43.00,
The Kline case is illustrative of the second general effect restrictions
have been found to have on value, that is, to lower the value of the restricted
stock. This was the position taken by the court in Parker where Worcester
County Trust Co. v. Commissioner" was cited with approval. The restriction
in Worcester County Trust required that before any sale of the stock could
be made to an outsider, an offer must first be made to the corporation which
could then purchase the stock for book value plus dividends. This restriction
was included in the by-laws of the corporation, and any subsequent pur-
chaser of the stock took subject to it. The court held that the price in the
agreement at which the corporation could purchase was not determinative
of the stock's value since, if the corporation did not exercise its option, the
stock could be sold for any price. It stated, however, that the restriction did
have a depressing effect on value because a commodity capable of being
freely sold is obviously worth more than the same commodity with restric-
tions on alienability. The crucial fact was that subsequent purchasers took
subject to the restriction.
In James Couzens," the court dealt with a similar right of first refusal,
except in Couzens subsequent purchasers did not take subject to the restric-
tion. The court found the restriction to have no depressing effect on value, 37
because the determination of fair market value requires the assumption of
a willing buyer and seller. Therefore, the court reasoned, although the stock
was more difficult to buy and sell,38 that fact should not have a depressing
effect on value. However, the assumption of a willing buyer and seller, which
was made in Couzens, should not change the reluctance of a future purchaser
to pay full value for stock which will remain subject to a restriction in his
hands as was the case in Parker. A buyer would be unwilling to pay the full
value since he is not receiving full value, that is, he is not receiving freely
alienable stock.
In Trot; a buyer of the restricted stock would take subject to restric-
34 In Kline, the stock was being valued for gift tax purposes, therefore, the taxpayer
was arguing for the lowest possible value.
35 134 F.2d 578 (1st Cir. 1943).
36 11 B.T.A. 1040 (1928).
37
 Accord, La Motte T. Cohn, 8 T.C. 796 (1947).
88 An example of the difficulties such a restriction would impose on the sale of the
restricted stock would be presented by a situation where the potential buyer would be
unwilling to wait until the option's time limit had expired.
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tions on future sales, but the Tax Court did not allow a discount for the
restricted shares. The court provides a satisfactory explanation for the
seeming contradiction with Parker and Worcester County Trust, in that
its decision was based on the nature of Construction—the fact that it had
no going-concern value. Because of this, the court found the maximum value
for all stock of the corporation to be its pro rata share of tangible assets.
If the option on Eaves' shares were exercised, the price guaranteed would be
equal to the pro rata share of these assets, therefore, no loss to the stock-
holder would occur. The court's reasoning appears sound. Stock has value
because it represents ownership of a corporation's assets and because it
allows the stockholder to share in future earnings of the corporation."
Because the latter element is not present in Construction, the court seems
correct in excluding it from its consideration while establishing the value of
that corporation's stock.
It is fortunate for the courts in both Trotz and Parker that they were
not required to appraise the extent of the influence of the restrictions. Al-
though it is difficult to assess whether a restriction affects stock value, it is
much more difficult to determine the extent of any effect found to exist. The
latter issue involves such a maze of factual determinations that any resolu-
tion of the problem is bound to be an approximation. Several of the cases
already discussed suggest some of the elements which must be considered
when assessing the extent of the effect of a restriction on alienability on the
value of the restricted stock. The court in Kline speculated on the probability
that the option holder would press an economic advantage and exercise the
option.4° The court in McCann suggested to the lower court that it consider
the stockholder's power to alter the by-laws and remove the restriction. 41
Many more examples of the factors relevant to the effect of restrictions on
stock value could be listed, but these few illustrations show that not only is
there no general agreement which factors should be included, but that many
of the factors by their very nature defy a precise quantitative measurement.
Whenever the taxpayer decides to structure the transaction to approach
the statutory cut-off point, he runs the risk that the Commissioner may
review the transaction and make an independent valuation. Although the
Commissioner may use the same standard, there can be no assurance that
he will reach the same dollar valuation reached by the taxpayer, especially
if factors such as restrictions on alienability are present. Not only is the
Commissioner's viewpoint different, there is no true standard upon which
either party can form or justify its appraisal of the precise effect of the
factors involved. In any judicial determination of this conflict the Commis-
sioner's valuation is prima facie correct, and the burden of proof rests on
the taxpayer to prove affirmatively a higher or lower valuation. 42
 Because
39 See Rev. Rul. 60, supra note 9, at 238-42; 14 W. Fletcher, Private Corporations
§ 7005 (perm. ed. 1965).
40 44 B.T.A. at 1056.
41 146 F.2d at 386.
42 Fesler v. Commissioner, 38 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 755
(1930); Rice v. Eisner, 16 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1926); Jr. Bonbright, supra note 7, at 1026.
Cf. Worcester County Trust Co, v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 578 (1st Cir. 1943), where
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of the lack of a sound standard, the taxpayer's opportunity to disprove the
Commissioner's valuation is slight. To be upheld, the Commissioner prob-
ably only needs to show that he considered the various factors."
But such lack of predictability is not peculiar to the effects of restric-
tions on alienability; similar problems plague all factors in valuation. Another
of these factors, important to both the Parker and Trotz cases, is the effect
of corporate control on the value of the taxpayer's stock.
B. Corporate Control
The case law concerning the effect of control on stock valuation meets
with the same general questions as that dealing with the effect of restrictions
on value, that is, whether control is a factor to be considered in valuation
cases, and if it is, how much weight should it be given in a particular situa-
tion. There is a line of authority which holds that control should not be
considered as a factor. In Lewis v. Racine," the court held that the "market
value of stock is to be determined from the value of that stock generally
and not from the special value which accrued to plaintiffs [sellers] by reason
of their majority control."" The court held all shares were of equal value
even though it recognized that as a practical matter controlling shares could
generally command a premium on sale." Similarly, the court in Rice v.
Eisner47 found that any increase in stock value caused by control is wholly
speculative. Furthermore, since any attempt to market a controlling block
would probably depress the market price of the stock, the court held that if
the size of the taxpayers' holdings mattered at all it tended to lower the
value of the stock.48
But the weight of authority holds that control increases value." This
line of authority recognizes that controlling shares can be sold at a premium,
a consideration that was noted, but disregarded in Rice. There are several
reasons why control increases the value of stock. First, control permits the
stockholder to develop special relations with the corporation and provides
opportunities for profit which are not available to minority stockholders."
Second, it costs less and it is often more convenient to deal in large blocks
of stock than in smaller blocks. Third, and perhaps most important with
regard to the effect of control on value is the power that control gives to the
the Commissioner's valuation was struck down without the taxpayer showing a suitable
alternative value. In this case, the Commissioner's valuation was found to be arbitrary.
43 Compare Worcester County Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 578 (1st Cir.
1943) with Charles T. Kline, 44 B.T.A. 1052 (1941), aff'd, 130 F.2d 742 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 697 (1943).
44 179 Wis. 210, 190 N.W. 476 (1923)..
45
 Id. at 220, 190 N.W. at 480.
49 See Estate of Nieman, 230 Wis. 23, 283 N.W. 452 (1939).
47 16 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1926).
49 The court felt a lower sales price would result from an attempt to market such
large quantities of the stock. Id. at 361.
49
 Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 265 App. Div. 208, 38 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1942);
Tyron v. Smith, 191 Ore. 172, 229 P.2d 251 (1951); Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares,
70 Harv. L. Rev. 986 & n.1 and authorities cited therein (1957).
59 See, e.g., Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 44 T.C. 745 (1965), where the purchaser
of a large block of stock was able to secure employment for former associates.
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shareholder to direct the affairs of the corporation, and thereby protect his
investment." It is only reasonable to expect that since such practical con-
siderations as the opportunities to develop special relations, the economies
of dealing with large blocks, and the power to direct the corporation's affairs
are reflected in the market price of the stock that they should also be re-
flected in the law of valuation.
As with restrictions on alienability, corporate control generally exerts
an undeniable but indeterminate influence on value. Well-reasoned authority
on the subject of control recognizes this influence and attempts to minimize
the uncertainties inherent in the appraisal of its extent by considering most
of the relevant factors in the particular case under consideration. As with
restrictions, there are no established rules to aid the taxpayer in determining
the dollars and cents value of controlling shares. Determination of the influ-
ence of the relevant factors is a matter of "good business judgment."52
Even if the taxpayer makes an allowance for the factors of control in his
valuation, he is likely to encounter a revaluation by the Commissioner and
thereafter, proof problems similar to those encountered when dealing with
restrictions. While the appraisal of the effect of control is difficult because
of the many factors which the various court opinions suggest should be con-
sidered, there may be other factors, not yet mentioned by the courts, which
should be considered in a truly complete analysis. Although there is general
agreement that a premium can be obtained for controlling stock, some courts
have held that the seller does not have an absolute right to retain this
premium. Even when courts talk of an "inalienable right" to sell the con-
trolling stock upon any terms that can be obtained, the right to keep the
premium is contingent on the seller not breaching a duty owed to the
corporation. 53 There have been long-established limits on the right of a
selling stockholder to retain the premium gained in the sale of controlling
stock 54 Berle and Means introduced a theory which would further limit this
right, namely, that control is a corporate asset. 55 The corporate asset theory
led to the conclusion that if a controlling interest was sold, any premium for
control could not be retained by the selling stockholder, but must be returned
to the corporation. Since that time, several other theories have been devel-
oped to reach the same result. Although these theories have been criticized, 56
some writers think they form the basis for the decision in Perlman v. Feld-
mann," a case which may have implications in the stock valuation area.
51 For a discussion of all these factors see Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to
Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 505 (1965).
52
 See p. 172 & note 8 supra.
53 E.g., Stanton v. Schenck, 140 Misc. 621, 251 N.Y.S. 211 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
51
 See, e.g., Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941), which concerned
the sale of a controlling interest to persons who should have been suspected of having
an intent to loot the corporation. See generally Annot., 50 A.L,R.2d 1146 (1956).
55
 A. Berle & G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 244 (1932).
56 Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 941 (1963); Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 986 (1957).
57
 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), rev'g 129 F. Supp. 162 (D. Conn. 1952). For views
that the corporate asset theory is expressed in Perlman, see Andrews, supra note 51, at
512-13; Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 10-11 (1956). But
see Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d at 670.
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In Perlman, a controlling interest in a steel producing corporation was
sold to a syndicate of ultimate steel users. The court in Perlman held that
the premium obtained for control when the majority stockholder sold his
interest should be returned to the corporation. The court required the seller
to return the premium since it was compensation for the sale of a corporate
asset. The asset the court referred to was the power to control allocation of
the corporate product in a time of short supply, therefore, the case is not
direct support for the Berle and Means theory which viewed control as the
corporate asset. But Perlman is obviously based on a closely related principle.
The limits of the Perlman doctrine have not yet been defined, but if
carried to the logical extremes, there are many situations in which corporate
control could be removed as a factor in stock valuation since the premium
could not be retained. Even without carrying Perlman to its logical extremes,
several factors are suggested which should be included in an appraisal of the
effect of control on value. For example, perhaps it should be queried whether
the duties which accrue by virtue of holding a majority interest will discount
any increase in value which control implies. And perhaps there should be
an examination of the field of potentially willing buyers to determine if there
can be any who are not only willing to pay a premium but from whom the
premium received could be retained. No court has yet considered such
factors, but they would seem to •be necessary to a complete analysis in some
cases.
In Parker, such an analysis was not necessary because the court found
sufficient added value to invoke section 1239 by simply considering the
increase due to the investment value of controlling shares. In Trotz, however,
the court did not discuss even the more generally accepted implications
of control on value. Parker in this respect is in accord with the authorities
previously discussed, while Trots is apparently incorrect in light of the tradi-
tional approach. Even granting the lack of going-concern value of Construc-
tion, control still allowed Trotz to protect his investment. This investment
value would be reflected in the market price as surely in Trots as it was in
Parker.
The court in Trots also apparently overlooked another influence control
might have on value. It held the value of all stock equal to its pro rata share
of the underlying corporate assets. It reasoned that a purchaser would only
be interested in purchasing the stock to gain possession of these assets. But
the court overlooked that purchasing Trotz' controlling stock would give the
buyer effective use of all the assets of the corporation, not just the percentage
of the assets determined by the ratio of Trotz's shares to all outstanding
shares. This is the essence of corporate control. It is submitted that to gain
use of all the assets, a buyer would be willing to pay a premium for con-
trolling stock and that this premium indicates a greater value in the
controlling shares than in the minority shares. If viewed in this light,
sufficient justification could have been found to hold that control increased
the value of Trotz' shares over their pro rata share of the underlying assets.
But even if the court in Trots had used this approach there is no
assurance it would have held for the Commissioner. It would still have been
necessary for the court to determine if the increase in value was large enough
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to give Trotz ownership of more than 80 percent in value of the outstanding
stock. Because Trotz' numerical holdings were so close to 80 percent, it is
reasonable to expect that the court would have held for the Commissioner.
But what if Trotz had held only 70 percent of the number of the outstanding
shares? Control would still be present in his holdings, but it cannot be said
with assurance that this fact would cause a 10 percent increase in the
value of his shares in relation to Kelly's. The difficulty in making such
determinations is the heart of the problem facing a taxpayer considering a
transaction within the purview of section 1239 and the other sections which
use the value test. This is not an impossible problem, but it is fraught with
enough complexity to make it extremely difficult for the taxpayer to be sure
of his answer. It is submitted that conflict is inevitable when such a complex
concept as stock valuation is made central to tax determinations. By re-
quiring stock valuation to be made, Congress has, in effect, made conflict
inevitable. The wisdom of this decision is open to question.
IV. THE STATUTORY VALUE TEST
The legislative history of the value test in section 1239 and related
sections of the Code reveals that this test was chosen to deal with a specific
evil. The value test first appeared in the Code when section 24(a) (6) (B) 58
was added by the Revenue Act of 1934. The House Bill which added this
section provided for a test based on the number of voting shares owned by
the taxpayer in order to measure the relationship between an individual and
his corporation." The Senate substituted a test which measured this relation-
ship by the percentage in value of the outstanding stock of the corporation.°
It is the value test drafted by the Senate which prevailed in section 24.
Later sections, such as section 1239, apparently adopted the test without
question, changing only the percentage requirement to meet the specific
objectives of the section .51
The House test, based on a count of the voting stock, had one distinct
advantage: it was easy to apply. It set forth a standard for tax planning
under which virtually no confusion could arise. A simple count of the number
of voting shares was all that the House version required. Neither taxpayers
nor the courts were required to consider the multitude of factors which enter
into stock valuation.
One shortcoming, however, caused its replacement by the value test.
The Senate foresaw that in corporations where there was more than one
class of stock, situations would arise where an individual holding stock of
considerable value in relation to all outstanding stock, and yet not holding a
large proportion of the voting stock, could receive the benefits which section
24 was intended to disallow. The Senate proposed the value test to close this
loophole, and the House aquiesced.
68
 Act of May 10, 1934, ch. 277, § 24, 48 Stat. 691. Section 267 of the 1954 Code
was derived from this act.
" H.R. 7835, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
60 Senate Committee on Finance, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., Report on the 1934 Revenue
Bill, 1 CCH Stand. Fed. Tax Serv. TI 341.04 (1935).
61 See note 13 supra.
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The value test is not without merit. It provides the flexibility required
in a test which measures the relationship between an individual and his
corporation. Flexibility is necessary because an inflexible test such as that
proposed by the House can be avoided by use of a complex capitalization
arrangement. Use of the value test enables the Commissioner and the courts
to examine the capitalization of the corporation to determine the extent of
the stockholder's ownership, even where different classes of stocks with dif-
ferent rights are used. While different classes of stock cannot be compared by
a standard such as voting power since some classes of stock cannot vote, all
stocks can be compared by use of a value test. The stockholder's interest can
then be computed simply by multiplying the number of shares he owns by
the value determined for each share. But the determination of the stock-
holder's interest by stock valuation is not as easy in practice as it is in
theory. Although the value test's flexibility provides its advantages, this
flexibility is also responsible for the complexity which the test entails.
A further shortcoming is that the value test is not precise. The test
involves such a multitude of factors, each with a different weight in different
situations that it invites error. In view of the reasons for the valuation, how-
ever, it is not practical to make a truly exact valuation. Because value has
many different meanings, it is necessary before making a valuation to con-
sider the purposes for which the valuation is required.°2 Both Parker and
Trotz discuss valuation as though they were valuing stock for estate or gift
tax purposes since this is the area in which stock valuation law developed.°"
Perhaps in the estate and gift tax areas the problems inherent in stock valua-
tion must be suffered since there is no alternative; property must be ap-
praised at a dollar value before it can be taxed. But under section 1239 and
related provisions, valuation of stock is not important as an end in itself.
Once the value is determined, no tax rate is applied to it in order to determine
a tax liability. On the contrary, value in the context of the sections under
consideration is useful only so far as it provides an index to measure the
nature and extent of the relationship between the taxpayer and the corpo-
ration. As in Parker and Trotz, when courts consider valuation problems,
they will discuss the importance of restrictions on alienability and corporate
control to the value of the taxpayer's shares. Although such a focus is in
accord with traditional valuation law, this focus can tend to lose sight of the
real issue under section 1239—the extent of the relationship between the
taxpayer and his corporation. The restrictions on alienability of Eaves' and
Kelly's shares, and the corporate control attached to Parker's and Trotz'
shares, is very revealing of the nature and extent of this relationship. That
these factors are also indicative of the value of the taxpayer's shares is only
of incidental importance except that section 1239 requires the value test
to be used.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE TEST
While the value test is useful in measuring the relation between a
stockholder and a corporation in which a complex capitalization arrangement
62 1 J. Bonbright, The Valuation of Property 10 (1937).
63 See, e.g., Wilson v. Bowers, 57 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1932) (Estate tax); Charles T.
Kline, 44 B.T.A. 1052 (1941) (Gift tax).
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is used, the Code makes no allowance for an alternative test to be applied
when such complexities are not present. It is important in this regard to
note that a large number of corporations do not use more than a single class
of stock.°4
 Therefore, as a practical matter, the complex value test is required
more often than can be justified. It is submitted that in corporations with
but a single class of stock an alternative to the value test should be used. The
proposed alternative test would measure the relationship by the number of
shares of the corporation owned by the taxpayer in relation to the total
number of outstanding shares.
The suggested simplification need not be limited to corporations
with a single class of stock. If, for example, a corporation issues one class of
common stock, and a single class of preferred stock which can be converted
into common stock at the will of the directors or the stockholder, these pre-
ferred shares could, for the purposes of the statute, be considered equal to
the number of shares of common stock that such conversion would bring.
The use of the value test is justified only when it provides a means of
judging the relative importance of stockholder's holdings when those
holdings are nonfungible. When a more easily applied standard is available,
the use of the value test injects unnecessary complexity into the determina-
tion. Congress should amend the present statute accordingly.
While it could be argued that the influence of control is so important to
the stockholder-corporation relationship that the proposed alternative is
defective because it does not reflect control, a reduction of the percentage
required to invoke the statute could solve the problem. Since control occurs
so commonly, an estimate of the average reduction of the statutory per-
centage which would compensate for influence of control could he made.
A similar solution could be used, when redrafting the statute, to negate the
influence of other commonly occurring factors such as restrictions on alien-
ability, if it is felt that these factors should be reflected in the measurement.
It could also be argued that even with the adjustments suggested above
the alternate test is not ideally suited to measuring the relationship between
the stockholder and the corporation because it fails .to account accurately
for many facets of the stockholder-corporation relationship. But it must be
remembered that the value test which it would replace is not ideally suited
to measuring this relationship either. In fact, the relationship is so complex
that any practical measurement must necessarily be only an approximation.
Like the present value test, the alternative measures the relationship by its
most important characteristic, the extent of the individual's ownership of
stock of the corporation. But unlike the value test, the alternative test can
84
 No statistics have been compiled to support this statement, but due to the nature
of the corporations with which § 1239 and related provisions are concerned, substantially
one-man businesses, the statement appears reasonable. Corporations of this type do use
more than one class of stock in special situations, for example, to obtain outside financing
or in employee incentive programs. But many corporations do not require outside
financing, and by using stock alienability restrictions, as did Parker and Trotz, the
dominant stockholder can allow employees to hold stock without risking loss of control.
For these reasons, it seems that Trotz and Parker present capitalization arrangements
typical of many corporations within the purview of § 1239 and related sections.
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be easily administered and it offers a standard for tax planning. The ease
with which the alternate test can be applied appears to outweigh its slight
relative inaccuracy. While limited use of the value test may be necessary, its
present wide use can not be justified in light of the available alternative.
PETER J. MONTE
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